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From False Teeth to Exoskeletons: The Body and 
Materiality in William Gibson’s Burning Chrome 
 
Hannah Collins 
University of Edinburgh 
Considering texts from William Gibson’s short story collection, Burning Chrome, this essay seeks to 
establish that the material ontology of the body cannot be discounted in current ontological and 
existential debates, but rather, we might re-conceptualise pre-existing notions of human selfhood 
under the conditions of a technologically enhanced social aesthetic.     
 
 If, as Veronica Hollinger argues, contemporary Science Fiction often problematises the 
nature-artifice dichotomy whilst keeping the human “ensconced in its privileged place at the centre of 
things”, then cyberpunk fiction “is about the breakdown of these oppositions” (204-5). The cyberpunk 
genre belongs to “implosive Sf” which, according to Istvan Csicsery-Ronay Jr., finds its defining motif 
in its interrogation of “the body-physical/body-social and drastic ambivalence about the body’s 
traditional - and terrifyingly uncertain - integrity” (188). As such, William Gibson’s fiction frequently 
portrays the “theme of body invasion” through the use of “prosthetic limbs, implanted circuitry, 
cosmetic surgery, [and] genetic alteration” (Hollinger 209-10). Gibson, often upheld as the ‘father’ of 
cyberpunk, explores the interaction between humanity and technology throughout his work, and 
considers the various kinds of relationships which result from this intimacy. His seminal novel 
Neuromancer (originally published in 1984) examines the human-technology relationship as the 
protagonist, Case, encounters artificial intelligence constructs that he comes into contact with by 
accessing cyberspace, termed by Gibson as “the matrix” (Neuromancer 12). Throughout the novel 
Case’s attitude towards his body seems to be characterised by contempt, as the narrator describes him 
as living in “the prison of his own flesh” (Neuromancer 12). This portrayal of the body appears to 
support claims made by critics such as Kevin McCarron that, for cyberpunk writers, “[t]he body […] is 
an ‘accident’ […] Running through all cyberpunk texts is a fascination with the ways in which the flesh 
is inessential, irrelevant” (262-7). Similarly, Christine Boyer contends that, in altering our physical 
being to incorporate emerging technologies, we aim to “annihilate the material body” (74). These 
critical perspectives are somewhat reductive, however, as they tend to overlook, perhaps even ignore, 
a human-technology relation wherein the body is not replaced but enhanced by technological 
constructs. With this in mind, it might be more productive to consider the ways in which, as David 
Tomas posits, “technology becomes the determining factor in the definition of the body’s physical re-
articulation”; that is, as a hybridised material ontology (38). The following discussion will examine 
texts taken from Gibson’s collection of short fiction, Burning Chrome, to contest the perspective that 
cyberpunk literature favours disembodiment and virtuality. Instead, it will be shown that Gibson 
portrays the material body as valuable despite the abundance of technologies with which it interacts. 
Furthermore, we will see that, whilst the material bodies which feature in Gibson’s texts are often 





augmented by artificial prostheses, these extensions are themselves material forms or, in the case of 
virtual technologies, remain grounded in material processes. This signifies, therefore, that the body-
technology relation does not necessarily lead to an abandonment of the flesh and an absorption into 
disembodied cyberspace.  
 
Sapiens and Cyborgs: Theorising the Material Body  
N. Katherine Hayles writes that “the body [is] the original prosthesis we all learn to 
manipulate” (3). By identifying the body as a ‘prosthesis’, Hayles implies that it is a technological 
construction and is, therefore, artificial. This resonates with Michel Foucault’s depiction of the body as 
a product of cultural conditioning and, furthermore, Susan Bordo's claim that there has never been 
anything inherently ‘natural’ about the body (Bordo 139-164; Foucault 135-169). For Bordo, “there is 
no ‘natural body’ […] Our bodies, no less than anything else that is human, are constituted by culture” 
(142). It seems, therefore, reductive to conceptualise the body-technology relationship within the 
context of a nature/artifice dichotomy, as this binary opposition intimates an essential ‘natural purity’ 
within the body that is displaced by a technological substitute. Both Foucault and Bordo theorise the 
cultural construction of the body in terms of discourse(s): it is a ‘cultural text’ impressed with the 
marks of current socio-political ideologies. It follows then, that the body gives expression to the 
prevailing cultural discourses by which we define ourselves and our ontology. If we are to read the 
body in terms of the human-technology interface, this can shed light on how the cultural construction 
of material bodies is made literal as we optimise our material ontology with the aid of artificial 
constructs. This kind of prosthetic enhancement does not displace our materiality, rather, it adds to 
our physical beings which consequently become the manifestation(s) of posthuman discourse. For 
instance, we may read a person’s prosthetic limb as an expression of hybridity, and view this 
technology as a material extension which sustains the user’s bodily capabilities rather than reducing 
them. The technological device does not replace the material body, rather, the damaged body is 
enhanced by it.   
 It is fair to claim that a central image of posthuman discourse is the cyborg which, according 
to Donna Haraway, is defined as “a cybernetic organism, a hybrid of machine and organism” (149). 
The cyborg, posits Haraway, can be used as a metaphor which describes a postmodern 
reconceptualisation of selfhood that is based on hybridity. For Haraway, the cyborg represents the 
notion of a discursive social politics wherein traditional boundary concepts (such as nature and 
artifice) are problematised. The figure of the cyborg presents the image of a literal, embodied 
posthumanism wherein traditional boundaries become extinct and the concept of a ‘pure’ human 
essence is refuted. This does not, however, banish humans from postmodern ontological modes, 
rather, as above, the cyborg invites a revision of notions of selfhood and subjectivity under the 
conditions of a hybridised social aesthetic. The physical cyborg is a particularly useful image to 
consider when examining Gibson’s fiction as, according to David Bell, “the cyborg keeps the body in 
view, while also raising questions about the boundaries of the body, about nature, culture and 
technology” (149-50). This discussion will, therefore, refer to this application of the cyborg at certain 
points to substantiate the analysis of Gibson’s textual body. Further to this, Bordo asserts that, “our 





bodies are trained, shaped, and impressed with the stamp of prevailing historical forms of selfhood” 
which, at least for Gibson, are grounded in notions of human-technology hybridity (165-66). With this 
in mind, we may read Gibson’s portrayal of the material body as a significant “medium of culture” 
which not only articulates a character’s social identity but also gives expression to key concepts of 
posthuman discourse, such as hybridity and cyborgisation (Bordo 165).           
 
Technobodies: The Material Body and Prosthetic Enhancement  
In “Johnny Mnemonic” (originally published in 1981) and “The Winter Market” (originally 
published in 1985), Gibson presents the reader with characters who have undergone surgery to 
enhance their physical being(s): Molly Millions, Johnny, Dog, and Lise are all typical images of the 
physical cyborg who, despite their various artificial enhancements, maintain a material ontology. 
Molly Millions (a character who also features in Gibson’s other texts) is described as having “mirrored 
lenses” over her eyes, “surgical inlays […] sealing her eyes in their sockets” (“Johnny Mnemonic” 19). 
She has also undergone surgery to have weaponry fused into her body: “[t]en blades snicker straight 
out from their recesses beneath her nails, each one a narrow, double-edged scalpel in pale blue steel” 
(“JM” 21). Molly presents a particularly compelling image of the physical cyborg figure as the impact 
of her surgical enhancements are somatic; that is, they do not affect her cognitive capabilities, only her 
physicality. In reading Molly’s body as a ‘cultural text’ that showcases the physical manifestation of 
posthuman discourse, we are presented with the apparent impossibility of the concept of (organic) 
purity as we see in her character a merger between flesh and technology. In this way, Molly’s 
augmented body expresses the ‘breakdown’ between nature and artifice, which Hollinger argues is a 
central distinction of the cyberpunk genre, whilst simultaneously remaining steadfastly material (204-
5). Molly’s physical augmentation contrasts with that of the story’s protagonist, Johnny, who has an 
extended memory capacity as a result of a computer chip being implanted into his brain. Johnny’s 
surgical augmentation is psychosomatic: the physical structure of his brain has been ‘re-wired’ using 
an artificial device which, in turn, affects his mental abilities. This seems to suggest the significance of 
the relationship between mind and body as the technologically-enhanced capabilities of the mind are 
contingent upon the presence of a physical prosthesis that functions by fusing with Johnny’s physical 
brain. Furthermore, despite having superior cognitive capabilities which are induced by a 
technological prosthesis, Johnny still seems to consider himself as ‘meat’. He describes himself to 
Ralfi, a gangster, as “a nice meatball chock-full of implants where you can store your dirty laundry” 
(“JM” 16). In Johnny’s referral to himself as ‘meat’, Gibson bestows a sense of value upon the material 
body as it seems that, despite his cyborgisation, Johnny remains acutely aware of his flesh. In this 
way, Gibson establishes a mind-body connection that does not privilege one over the other and, 
moreover, demonstrates the ways in which technology is also dependent upon materiality. It seems, 
rather, that technology and the body are mutually reliant upon one another as Johnny’s brain provides 
a kind of ‘power source’ which, in turn, enables the microchip to enhance his cognitive capabilities. In 
this way, Johnny’s body seems to represent the “redefinition of the subject through the multiple 
superimposition of bio-technological apparatuses” as he is at once defined as ‘meat’ as well as a 





cybernetic storage device (Bukatman 98). His body is the physical site of a cyborg politics that posits 
the “prospect of technological symbiosis” (Bukatman 103). 
 Though it is tempting to think of Gibson as a writer for whom technological enhancements are 
always portrayed as ‘hi-tech’ futuristic constructs (as with Johnny’s surgically implanted computer 
chip), other prosthetic devices feature within his fiction that constitute perhaps a more ‘primitive’ 
image of the physical cyborg. The character of Dog serves as an example of such “Lo Tek […] [l]ow 
technique, low technology” surgical enhancement which further problematises the notion that 
cyberpunk literature disregards material ontological forms (“JM” 28). Upon meeting Dog for the first 
time Johnny seems somewhat shocked by his augmented physical appearance, remarking: 
Dental augmentation impeded his speech […] He might have been fifteen, but the fangs and a 
bright mosaic of scars combined with the gaping socket to present a mask of total  bestiality. It 
had taken time and a certain kind of creativity to assemble that face, and his posture told me 
he enjoyed living behind it […] He did something with his mouth that approximated a grin. 
(“JM” 28) 
 As with Molly, Dog’s prosthetic enhancements are purely somatic as the impact of his 
“[d]ental augmentation” is designed to be solely physical (“JM” 28). The purpose of Dog’s material 
augmentation, however, differs from that of Johnny and Molly in terms of how the technology 
modifies his body as a ‘cultural text’. For Dog, as well as many other “Lo Tek[s]”, the incorporation of 
technology onto his material body is designed to give expression to his social identity as an inhabitant 
of “The Killing Floor”, a part of “Nighttown” that is made up of discarded scrap materials collected 
from the surrounding areas (“JM” 34). Johnny also remarks that “Lo Tek fashion ran to scars and 
tattoos”, as well as teeth, which resonates with claims posited by both Foucault and Bordo that culture 
is inscribed upon the body (“JM” 32). Through his portrayal of the characters’ use of technology, 
however ‘primitive’, Gibson seems to intimate the ways in which we already incorporate artificial 
constructs onto our bodies so as to establish social identity. The “Lo Tek[s’]” use of physical 
augmentation, therefore, demonstrates the significance of materiality as being a key component in the 
articulation of identity.                 
 Gibson further interrogates the body-technology relationship in “The Winter Market”. Here 
the character of Lise uses an exoskeleton to aid her quotidian routine and becomes increasingly 
dependent on technology as the narrative progresses. The narrator details Lise’s physical appearance 
in a passage that is at once captivating and horrifying: 
The exoskeleton carried her across the dusty broadloom with that same walk, like a model 
down a runway. Away from the crash of the party, I could hear it click softly as it moved her. 
[…] I could see the thing’s ribs when she stood like that, make them out across her back 
through the scuffed black leather of her jacket. One of those diseases. Either one of the old 
ones they’ve never quite figured out or one of the new ones - the all too obviously 
environmental kind - that they’ve barely even named yet. She couldn’t move, not without  that 
extra skeleton, and it was jacked straight into her brain, myoelectric interface. The fragile-
looking polycarbon braces moved her arms and legs, but a more subtle system handled her 
thin hands, galvanic inlays. (“TWM” 145) 





Rather than simply championing the amalgamation of flesh and technology, in his depiction of the 
exoskeleton Gibson encapsulates a complex web of attitudes towards the prospect of a technologically-
enhanced posthumanism which range from fascination to anxiety and disgust (Heise 138-40). At first 
Lise seems sexualised as her movements are compared to a “model”, and the reader is made aware of 
the (male) narrator’s gaze upon her body (“TWM” 145). Any instance of sexual desire, however, 
quickly turns into a discourse of medicalised horror as the narrator draws our attention to the cause of 
Lise’s dependence upon the exoskeleton: she has a debilitating disease. Finally, the narrator 
implements a rhetoric of artifice and cybernetics as he turns to the technical aspects of the device and 
the ways in which it interacts with Lise’s physical body. In reading Lise’s augmented body as a 
‘cultural text’, there appears to be a sense of anxiety regarding the incorporation of technologies 
into/onto the material body. In response to her personal experience with prosthetics, Vivian Sobchack 
expresses a deep uncertainty as to whether the material body is being forced to give way to 
technologies that become ever more ubiquitous as our physical beings become increasingly 
transparent (209-11). Sobchack writes that the sense of “euphoria” surrounding the “visibility of new 
technologies” is a kind of “‘false consciousness’ - for it has ‘lost touch’ with the very material and 
mortal body” (211). The sense of apprehension expressed here over the emergence of new 
technologies, particularly in terms of their impact upon the human condition, may at first glance seem 
irrelevant to cyberpunk texts as they are often seen to glamourise the demise of the flesh. Gibson’s 
portrayal of the body-technology interface, however, presents a much more complex relationship 
between humans and technology that actually perpetuates the significance of materiality.     
 Lise allows her body to merge with technology as an act of self-preservation, as opposed to a 
gratuitous use of prosthetics for the sake of becoming artificially enhanced. Note that Gibson shows 
Lise to add to her physical being, rather than choosing to actually replace her ‘original’ body parts. In 
fact, everything that is done to Lise’s body is meant to aid her continued survival in that material form. 
The narrator remarks that: 
[Lise’s] agents brought in medics, who padded the polycarbon with foam and sealed the sores 
over with micropore dressings. They pumped her up with vitamins and tried to work on her 
diet. (“TWM” 155) 
It is only as a last resort that Lise “[merges] with the net, [crosses] over for good” into “cybernetic 
immortality” (“TWM” 140, 164). Though this departure into cyberspace may seem to fulfil the 
cyberpunk ‘prophecy’ that the material body is inessential, Lise’s determination to sustain her 
material existence for as long as possible seems to contest this view. One might also contend that the 
very presence of a prosthetic device implies a sense of ‘failure’ on the part of the body, as Robert 
Rawdon Wilson writes, “[a]n appended body part not only recalls the previous, now missing, organic 
part, but actively calls into question the body’s integrity” (251). However, as we have seen, this notion 
of an “organic part” or, indeed, an ‘organic’ whole is severely problematic as we must acknowledge 
that the body is constructed and conditioned by culture (Bordo 165-84; Rawdon Wilson 251). 
Moreover, it seems that, particularly for Lise, her body has not ‘failed’ but, to use Haraway’s 
terminology, it has been ‘optimised’ by the technology which acts upon it; the purpose of Lise’s 
prosthetics is not to replace but to enhance her body (161-62). In this way, through his portrayal of 





Lise, as with his construction of Johnny, Gibson seems to intimate the sense that the body-technology 
interface does not necessarily render the material body obsolete. Moreover, for Lise, the exoskeleton 
not only becomes a part of her physical being but it is also recognised as constituent of her social 
identity as a celebrity: 
It was like she was born to the form […] You see something like that and you wonder how 
many thousands, maybe millions, of phenomenal artists have died mute, down the centuries, 
people who could never have been poets or painters or saxophone players, but who had this 
stuff inside, these psychic waveforms waiting for the circuitry required to tap in…  
(“TWM” 154) 
Lise is revered for her ability to interact with cyber constructs, and her use of an exoskeleton acts as a 
physical representation of her close interactive relationship with technology; she literally wears her 
talent during her everyday life. Consequently, we may interpret Lise’s material body as a ‘cultural text’ 
that gives literal expression to her passion: pushing the boundaries of her artistic capability through 
incorporation of technology into/onto her material being.  
 
Virtual Matter(s): The Body and Virtual Technologies  
 Though the texts we have seen so far lend themselves to the argument that Gibson does not 
discount material ontology in his fiction, it is yet possible to identify instances wherein the physical 
body is presented as being, perhaps, subsidiary. In both “Dogfight” (originally published in 1985) and 
the collection’s title piece, “Burning Chrome” (originally published in 1982), Gibson seems to 
relinquish his emphasis on the significance of the material body. Instead, these texts appear to explore 
the ways in which humans might engage with technological constructs that enable the user to interact 
with digital, or virtual, reality and escape the physical confines of their body. 
 In “Dogfight”, Gibson and Swanwick showcase a body-technology interface which enables the 
user to interact with a virtual environment. The protagonist, Deke, participates in an aerial assault 
game, “Spads&Fokkers”, in which the components are virtually generated (“Df” 171). To play the 
game, Deke uses a device that interfaces with his brain in order for him to control the movements of 
his pieces within the game’s program: “[h]e fitted the Batang behind his ear […] the base of [Deke’s] 
skull buzzed uncomfortably as the program ran” (“Df” 117). Deke’s preoccupation with virtuality is 
mirrored by another character, Nance's, penchant for designing and building computer-generated 
image projections. The two characters soon become so immersed in their respective engagement with 
technology that their lives seem to centre around it. Deke becomes obsessed with refining his combat 
skills and so spends an increasing amount of time engaged with the gaming program. The narrator 
describes Deke’s intimate interaction with the game software, commenting that, “[c]omputerised 
hypos fed a slow trickle of high-performance enhancement mélange into his bloodstream […] Sensors 
were wired directly into his skull” (“Df” 181). Nance, on the other hand, is determined to perfect her 
ability to build realistic projection programs. She remarks to Deke: “[n]ext month I’m going to splice 
two hundred separate flame programs together […] Then I’ll tap the mind’s body image to make [the 
projection] self-orientating” (“Df” 182). “Burning Chrome”, on the other hand, imagines a society 
wherein people have access to virtual reality constructs termed by Gibson as “simstim” and “the 





Matrix” (“BC” 195, 211).2 The characters’ apparent desire to engage with these kinds of technologies, 
Automatic Jack describes Rikki Wildside’s life ambition as “to be in simstim” (“BC” 211), seems to 
supersede their concern with the material world. This is further suggested by the piece’s title which 
alludes to Automatic Jack and his partner, Bobby Quine’s, objective to hack the computer of another 
notorious hacker-gangster known as Chrome. The act of ‘burning’ refers to digital theft wherein Jack 
and Bobby use software to ‘break into’ Chrome’s network and transfer Mafia funds into to their 
possession. It would seem, then, that the characters of “Dogfight” and “Burning Chrome” are more 
invested in their prowess in connection to technological constructs than they are concerned with the 
material world.  
 With further consideration, however, we see that Gibson yet grounds his characters’ ontology 
in materiality in these respective texts. In “Dogfight”, the characters’ abilities - Deke’s gaming skills 
and Nance’s expertise with projection programs - remain dependent upon their respective material 
beings. During one of Deke’s games the narrator remarks that, “[t]he onboard computers monitored 
biochemistry and decided when to open the sluice gates and give the human component a killer jolt of 
combat edge” (“Df” 181). This passage demonstrates that a player’s ability to perform during the game 
remains contingent upon their physical being as, despite engaging with VR, factors such as 
‘biochemistry’ are registered as significant. The physical brain is constantly monitored and the 
computer program responds to the body’s activity accordingly. Moreover, both Deke and Nance resort 
to using a drug, known as “hype”, in order to excel at their respective endeavours (“Df” 182). The drug 
grants its user “perfect visualisation”, a useful advantage to have when working with virtual 
projections (“Df” 183). Though the effects of the drug are psychosomatic - it affects both the body and 
the mind - the act of taking drugs is material; it requires an interaction between the body and a 
physical substance. Further to this, in “Burning Chrome”, Rikki’s ambition to be ‘in simstim’ is 
dependent upon her material body and its interaction with physical technological prostheses. “Zeiss 
Ikon” is the most sought-after brand of ‘simstim’ technology that works by being implanted into an 
individual’s eyes, allowing others to access that person’s ‘simstim’ environment. The fact that this 
technology must be surgically inserted into the body establishes the significance of materiality, as it 
retains a role in relation to virtual reality constructs. Referring to Gibson’s presentation of the body-
technology relationship, Dani Cavallaro postulates that having a presence in a virtual environment 
does not necessarily render the material body obsolete as “it is grounded in ritual/ceremonial 
experiences of an eminently material nature” (78-79). Gibson seems to suggest this kind of ‘material 
grounding’ in “Dogfight” through Deke and Nance’s drug use as, despite their interactions with virtual 
constructs, their ability to perform or excel within this space remains dependent upon their respective 
material bodies. This sense of a ‘material grounding’ is further reinforced in “Burning Chrome” in 
Gibson’s portrayal of surgical enhancement. In this way, writes Cavallaro, Gibson demonstrates that, 
“the body is undoubtedly altered by technology but not transcended […] [t]he material plays a crucial 
role” (75). It seems that, though at first glance both “Dogfight” and “Burning Chrome” appear to 
disregard the material body, it remains integral to the characters’ experience of, and engagement with, 
technology.    
 






In a way typical of his fiction, it seems that throughout this selection from Burning Chrome 
Gibson figures the material body as an object that is constantly being augmented and altered by 
technology, be it in the form of VR constructs or surgically implanted protheses. In his portrayal of 
Johnny Mnemonic, Molly Millions, and Lise, Gibson posits that, in its prosthetic extension, the body 
is not necessarily replaced but enhanced by technology. Moreover, these particular technologies - 
Molly’s scalpel blades, Johnny’s memory chip, and Lise’s exoskeleton - are themselves material 
constructs. Gibson’s depiction of his characters’ preference for material technological enhancement 
would seem to reinforce the central thesis of this discussion that cyberpunk texts such as Gibson’s do 
not always seek to annihilate the body. Rather, they draw on the image of the physical cyborg in order 
to present a literal manifestation of posthumanism and its proposed hybridised politics. Chris Hables 
Gray writes that, in this way, Gibson’s conception of the physical cyborg “reminds us that we are 
always embodied, but that the ways we are embodied are not simple” (7). This suggests that Gibson’s 
portrayal of the body-technology relationship is more complex than a mere assertion of one 
ontological mode (material/virtual) over the other. It seems that we must consider the possible 
outcomes of a cyborgised conception of the self, rather than hastily concluding that we have departed 
from a material existence altogether. Furthermore, when Gibson does consider the body’s significance 
in relation to VR constructs, as in “Dogfight” and “Burning Chrome” it appears that this engagement 
with advanced technologies is yet rooted in material rituals, such as drug use, therefore preventing the 
body from being eviscerated. Far from an abandonment of the flesh, it appears that, at least for 
Gibson, the material body continues to be upheld by cyberpunk fiction as a current and valued 
ontological mode. Further still, this mode of being is crucial to our on-going conceptualisation of the 
human self as we become increasingly acquainted with technological prostheses.    






1 Henceforth ‘Science Fiction’ will be referred to as ‘Sf’. 
2 The phrase ‘virtual reality’ will hereafter be shortened to ‘VR’. 
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